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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the aims of social indicator research is to develop a comprehensive measure of 
quality-of-life in nations that is analogous to GNP in economic indicator research. For that 
purpose, several multi dimensional indexes have been proposed. In addition to economic 
performance, these also acknowledge the nation's success in matters like schooling and 
social equality. The most current indicator of this type is the 'Human Development Index'. In 
this approach QOL is measured by input; the degree to which society provides conditions 
deemed beneficial. The basic problem is that one never knows to what extent the cherished 
provisions are really good for people. 
 An alternative is measuring QOL in nations by output, and consider how well people 
actually flourish in the country. This 'apparent' QOL can be measured by the degree to which 
citizens live long and happily. This conception is operationalized by combining registration 
based estimates of length-of-life, with survey data on subjective appreciation-of-life. Life-
expectancy in years is multiplied by average happiness on a 0-1 scale. The product is named 
'Happy Life-Expectancy' (HLE), and can be interpreted as the number of years the average 
citizen in a country lives happily at a certain time. 
 HLE was assessed in 48 nations in the early 1990's. It appears to be highest in North-
West European nations (about 60) and lowest in Africa (below 35).  
 HLE scores are systematically higher in nations that are most affluent, free, equal, 
educated, and harmonious. Together, these country-characteristics explain 70% of the 
statistical variance in HLE. Yet HLE is not significantly related to unemployment, state 
welfare and income equality, nor to religiousness and trust in institutions. HLE does not 
differ either with military dominance and population pressure. 
 The conclusion is that HLE qualifies as the envisioned comprehensive social indicator. It 
has both clear substantive meaning (happy life-years) and a theoretical significance (ulti-
mate output measure). HLE differentiates well. Its correlations fit most assumptions about 
required input, but also challenge some. The indicator is likely to have political appeal. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1.       INTRODUCTION 
 
In the first half of this century, quality-of-life in nations was largely measured by the material 
level of living. The higher that level in a country, the better the life of its citizens was 
presumed to be. As such, quality-of-life was measured by GNP related measures, currently 
by 'real' GDP per head. 
 This materialistic conception of QOL was never unquestioned, but criticism long 
remained marginal. Yet in the 1960's, the opinion climate changed. Saturation levels were 
reached and the ecological limits of economic growth came in view. This gave rise to a call 
for broader indicators of quality-of-life, which materialized in the so called 'Social Indicator' 
movement. The name of 'social' indicators signifies that the mere economic performance does 
not suffice. 
 From its beginning, one of the aims of Social Indicators Research was to develop a social 
equivalent to the economist's GNP. Several measures have been proposed since. 
 
1.1     Current measures of Quality-of-Life in nations 
Though social indicators research arose from discontent with economic indicators, most 
alternative measures do involve material 'level of living'. They add further criteria. The new 
social indicators of quality-of-life differ in the criteria which they add and how many. Scheme 1
provides an illustrative overview. Similar indicators of this kind have been proposed by 
Drenowski (1974), Liu (1977), Mootz (1990), Slottje (1991) and Kacapyr (1996), to mention 
a few.   
  As yet, none of these indicators reached acceptance comparable to GNP, neither in the realm 
of politics, nor in the scientific world. The Human Development Index is still the most 
accepted one in this class, but it is also the least different. 
 
1.2    Problems with these measures 
The reason for this lack of success is not only found in the continued dominance of 
materialist views, but also in several weaknesses of this generation of indicators. 
 
Arbitrary selection 
The most evident weakness is the selection of aspects of QOL. There is difference in number 
of aspects and in content of aspects involved. 
 As we can see in scheme 1, the Human Development Index suffices with 3 aspects, 
whereas the Index of Social Progress involves 11. Estes tried to include as much information 
as available in national statistics. Yet is more better? Should we include all things ever 
associated with QOL? Obviously inclusiveness goes at the cost of substantive meaning. 
 Yet selection requires choice, and choice for one aspect or another is difficult to 
argument. The example of divorce may illustrate the problem. Divorce-rate is part of the 
indexes of Naroll and Estes, but does not figure in the other indexes. Should it be included? 
Divorce is clearly no fun and has several negative consequences for affected children and 
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society. Yet dissolution of unsuccessful marriages has advantages as well, particularly in 
highly individualized societies. 
 
Arbitrary weights  
Next to the question whether divorce rate should be counted positive or negative, there is the 
question whether it is more or less important that other items in the index. For instance: is 
divorce-rate more important than murder-rate, or less important than GNP?.  
 Still another problem is that relative importance is mostly not the same everywhere. As 
suggested, the effects of divorce may be more positive in highly individualized societies. 
That means that its weight should in fact be variable. 
 Current indexes do not acknowledge such complications. They simply count items either 
positive or negative, and give items the same weight, irrespective of the situation of the 
nation. In the Human Development Index for instance, schooling counts equally strong as 
GNP. 
 
Limited universal relevance of items 
This brings us a more fundamental problem: Most items do not have the same significance 
across culture and time.  
 Some of the items in current QOL-indexes seem to be valued everywhere. For instance 
'economic prosperity' and 'high life-expectancy', though even on these matters there is 
difference in degree of adherence. However, on many further points disagreement prevails. 
For example on women's rights. Several countries see that as a sign of decay (like divorce) 
rather than as quality-of-life.  
 One can discount that problem by saying that value-free measurement of QOL is not 
possible, and admit that one measures the quality of the world's countries by current Western 
values. Yet, the political use of the indicator is clearly limited by such disagreements. 
 Yet another problem is that most of the items tend to loose significance over time. This is 
for instance the case with 'education', which seems subject to the law of diminishing utility. 
Schooling for everybody is clearly better than mass-illiteracy, but should we call the quality-
of-life in a society better if 50% of its citizens receives university education rather than 15%? 
Possibly over-education can even reduce the quality-of-life. Likewise, gains in economic 
affluence become less relevant when society becomes more affluent. In fact, items appear on 
the QOL-list if they are problematic at some point in history, and should therefore be omitted 
if no longer pressing.  
 One can dispose of the problem by saying that present day indicators suit present day 
problems. Still it is preferable to have an indicator that allows comparison over time. How 
else can we judge whether QOL improves or not? 
 
No clear meaning of sum-scores 
GDP per head has a clear substantive meaning. It indicates the amount of goods and services 
the average citizen can purchase. The indicator may labor some technical imperfections, but 
it is at least clear as to what it is about.  
 That is not the case with current 'social' indexes of QOL. The sum-scores reflect the 
degree to which different notions about the good society are met, but not which notions 
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precisely. They reflect mixed qualities rather than one quality. In other words: these measures 
provide a 'quality profile', but not 'inclusive value'. 
  Some of the indexes are in fact more specific and equate quality-of-life more or less 
with 'modernity'. They measure in fact the degree to which characteristics of dominant Wes-
tern society are present in a nation. This may be apt when the aim is to monitor how the 
nation is doing in catching up. Yet it is misleading to call that 'quality-of-life'. Modernization 
should not be equated with the good life. One of the very reasons for QOL-measurement is 
checking whether 'social progress' leads us to a better life . 
 
Mixing up quality of society, with quality-of-life in society 
Most indexes claim to tap how well people live in the country. Labels like 'quality-of-life' 
and 'well-being' suggest that the focus is on individuals. Items like life-expectancy are indeed 
indicative of individual thriving. Yet this is less clear with items such as economic affluence 
or cultural similarity. These things can be seen as good for people, but also as desirable for 
society. Statements on that matter are typically ambiguous. Still there is a problem; What is 
good for people is not always desirable for society, and vice versa.  
 
Mixing up means and ends 
The most fundamental problem with this generation of QOL-indicators is that they involve 
criteria of a different order. They do not distinguish between means and ends, nor between 
societal input and societal output. This can be illustrated with the two items that are part of 
most indexes: 'economic affluence' and 'life-expectancy'.  
 Economic affluence can hardly be seen as an end in itself. Command over goods and 
services may be instrumental in creating a good life, but does not constitute the good life it-
self. On the other hand, life-expectancy is typically an endvalue. We want to life long 
because we value life in itself. 
 In the same vein, supply with goods and services can be seen as a societal 'input', and 
life-expectancy as 'output'. In the following paragraphs I will argue that quality-of-life in a 
notion can better measured by output than by input.  
 Shoveling means and ends on one heap is not only theoretically unsatisfactory, but also 
reduces the political relevance of these measures. Policy-makers must know two things: to 
what extent instrumental policy-aims are realized, and whether success in that contributes to 
higher goals. Sum-scores that mix up these matters do not inform about either. The label of 
'quality-of-life' bears the suggestion that some final end is indicated. Yet in practice the items 
in the indexes are issues on the political agenda. As such these measures say more about 
advancement in the course taken than about the merits of that heading.  
 
 
2.        CONCEPTIONS OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE IN NATIONS 
 
The core of the problem with these measures lies at the conceptual level. If we are not clear 
about what we mean with QOL, we will never have sensible measures of it. Let us therefore 
consider the various notions involved. 
 A first thing then is to distinguish between quality of nations and quality-of-life in 
nations. In other words: between conceptions of the 'good society' and conceptions of the 
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'good life'. These notions are related, and even overlap to some extent. Yet they are not the 
same. 
 
2.1       Quality of nations 
Current standards for the quality of nations can be summarized in four clusters: 1) stability-
criteria, 2) productivity-criteria, 3) ideal-criteria and 4) criteria of habitability. The latter is 
also referred to as 'quality-of-life in nations.  
 
2.1.1   System-stability  
Standards of the good society concern first of all the presence of a stable social fabric. 
Without society there can be no good society. Applied to nations, this criterion requires that 
there is order and continuity in the country. In this respect, the quality of many new African 
nations is currently judged poor. 
 It is clear that every nation at least needs some stability. Once past a minimum level, 
preference for more stability or less is a matter of taste. In present day Western societies, 
conservatives complain about the fast pace of change, while modernists see too much 
continuity. 
 The criterion of stability has many aspects (e.g. predictability, constancy) and can be 
applied on various subsystems (e.g. political system, kinship system). Hence a nation may be 
stable in some respects, but not in others. This is one of the reasons why there are no 
comprehensive measures of social stability in nations. 
 
2.1.2  Productivity  
Nations are also judged by their yields. In the current discourse the emphasis is on economic 
productivity. The greater the quantity, quality and variety of the goods and services it 
generates, the better the country. In this respect East Asian countries are seen to do well, 
while Western nations are seen to loose their edge. Economic productivity of nations is 
typically measured by GNP. 
 Though mostly used for market products, the criterion can also be applied to non-market 
services, such as family support for the aged on the basis of normative reciprocity. Non-
monetary productivity is not reflected by calculations of GNP, and only partly by estimates 
of 'real' GDP. 
 In a longer view, the productivity criterion is also applied to inventions, not only 
technical and scientific discoveries, but also innovations in arts and in social organization. In 
this respect we think more of early Greek civilization than of the Viking's productivity. This 
latter kind of productivity is not well reflected in GNP either. 
 
2.1.3  Ideal-expression 
Another class of criteria concerns the degree to which a nation realizes certain values. Early 
writings on the Good Society emphasized individual lifestyle values, such as 'bravery', 
'modesty' and religious 'devotion'. The quality of a society was deemed higher, the more it 
emphasized such values, and the more its members actually lived accordingly. This view is 
still dominant in present day 'fundamentalist' thinking. Modern notions focus more on social 
organization. Nations are currently judged by the degree to which they allow 'political 
freedom', respect 'civil rights' and realize 'social equality'. 
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 In this genre, there are as many criteria as there are ideologies. Though innumerable in 
principle, the actual variation in values endorsed is limited. Present day world-society 
witnesses a growing ideological consensus around Humanist values (Naroll 1984: ch 2.) In 
fact, there is a strong movement to canonize such values as 'Universal Human Rights'. Some 
of these notions of quality have been made measurable. In the following paragraphs we meet 
with indicators of nation-performance with respect to freedom, justice and equality. 
 
2.1.4  Livability 
The last category of criteria concerns the nation's quality as a habitat. 'Livability' or 
'habitability' of a country is also referred to as 'quality-of-life in the nation'3. 
 
'Livability' of a nation can be defined as the degree to which its provisions and require- 
ments fit with the needs and capacities of its citizens. A nation is not well livable if, for  
instance, it fails to meet minimal needs for food, safety and contacts. It is also unlivable if 
its structure is too complex to handle for most citizens, or if its morals require the impossible. 
 
 Human needs and capacities are to a great extent given by nature. Socialization typically 
modifies and cultivates parts of our innate possibilities. There are thus limits to human 
adaptability, which societies cannot ignore. Where bio-physiological needs are concerned this 
is rather evident. Any society must provide 'food' and 'shelter'. The existence of bio-
psychological needs is less obvious, but no less true. Societies must also provide a sense of 
'security', 'identity' and 'meaning'.  
 To some extent societies can mould their members to their provisions. A society that 
provides little security can socialize to psychological hardiness, and therefore be still reaso-
nably livable for its members. Such compensation through socialization is not an automatism 
however; unsafe societies tend to breed vulnerable people. 
 Social evolution does not guarantee that all societies are highly livable. Extremely unliva-
ble societies probably tend to extinction; either because their members die out, or because 
they desert. However, societies that provide only poor livability do not always have fewer 
survival chances. Low livability can instigate wars of conquest, or mobilize economic effort. 
Badly livable societies can therefore become dominant. Critics of modernity claim that is 
typically the case with present day nation states. Yet there are also anthropological reports of 
'primitive' societies that are badly livable (Edgerton, 1992). 
 
The criterion of quality-of-life in the nation (livability) overlaps to some extent with the earlier
mentioned criteria of quality of the nation. Good life for its citizens requires at least some order
and continuity in the nation, a minimum of productivity and some congruence between ideal 
and reality. For that reason, the two quality concepts are often equated. 
 Yet, a nation can fail to provide a good life to its citizens in spite of high performance on 
the other quality criteria. In some nations, social stability is enforced by brute repression. 
Such nations are typically not very livable. This was the case with former East-European 
nations. Likewise, highly productive societies can wear their members out. Several social 
critics see that happen in Japan and the USA (f.e. Schor, 1991). Lastly, the demands implied 
in some ideals seem to exceed human possibilities. This is illustrated in the failure of 19th 
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century utopian 'communes'. It appeared hard to live with the ideals one lived up to. In the 
present century the Russian and Chinese revolutions even more spectacularly demonstrated 
that ideology can be unlivable. 
 
 
2.2        Quality-of-life in nations 
Quality-of-life in nations was specified as livability of nations. Livability of a nation was 
defined as the fit of its provisions and requirements to needs and capacities of its citizens. 
That match cannot be observed as such: the degree to which it exists must be derived from 
observations of other things. There are two ways to estimate quality-of-life in a nation. 
 
Measurement approaches 
One way is to assess the presence of preconditions deemed likely to produce a fit. This 
involves assumptions about fit-likeliness of living conditions. The focus in this approach is 
on societal input.  
 The other way is to observe how people actually flourish in the nation, and attribute good 
functioning to good fit. The focus is than on societal output. 
 
An analogy may illustrate the matter: the case of 'fertility' of the soil. If we want to know 
whether some piece of land is well suited for growing grain ('livable for grain'), we can 
estimate the input that soil provides or consider the output it has yielded earlier. 
 In the input approach, we consider the structure of the soil, its percentage of moisture, the 
minerals it contains, etc. Because we know fairly well what grain needs and to what 
conditions it can adapt, we can then estimate the fit reasonably well, that is: predict how well 
grain will grow on that soil.  
 In the output approach we consider the harvest; either by retrieving information on earlier 
crops or by trying. We then look at the quantity and quality of the grain harvested. 
 Through the ages, fertility of land has been established by finding through experience 
(output). Only fairly recently did we gather sufficient knowledge on a limited number of 
plants to specify their necessary living conditions in advance (input). 
 The living conditions of grain can now be specified reasonably well. Needs and 
capacities of that species are rather clear cut and have been discovered by controlled expe-
rimentation. The necessary living conditions for humans can less easily be specified. Not 
only is the human organism more complicated and many-sided than grain is, but also are 
humans much more adaptable. In fact, a major biological specialization of the human species 
is its unspecialism, combined with a capacity for learning. Therefore, the possible variation in 
livable societies for humans is greater than the possible variation in fruitful soils for grain. 
Controlled experimentation is hardly possible with humans and human societies. Hence it is 
also more difficult to discover basic human needs and capacities. 
 Let us keep these problems in mind and now consider current estimates of quality-of-life 
in nations. 
 
2.2.1     Input approach: 'presumed' quality-of-life 
As we have seen in the introductory paragraph, most measures of quality-of-life in nations 
assess presence of conditions such as material affluence, schooling, political freedom and 
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social equality. The common assumption is that more of such conditions fits human nature 
better than less. There are at least two problems with this approach: 
 The first problem is that the assumed fit is highly questionable in most cases. Consider 
the example of economic affluence: Does a rich society provide a better fit with individual 
needs and capacities than a not so rich society? Though people typically 'want' to improve 
their material standard of living, it is doubtful that they really 'need' to. It is also uncertain 
whether a rich society challenges human capacities more optimally than one not so rich. In 
fact, the human species has developed in material conditions that would be judged as poor by 
present day standards. 
 The second problem in this approach is the assumption that more of such conditions 
always denote better quality-of-life. Let us consider the case of social stability. A minimum 
level of stability is certainly required, too much change frustrates needs for safety and 
overcharges adaptive capacities. However, a society without any change is not likely to fit 
either: it will frustrate the need for novelty and leave adaptive capacities under-utilized. 
 
An evident way to avoid these problems is to depart from a well established theory about 
human needs and capacities and to specify the social conditions that are required to fit with 
these. This is called the basic need approach. Though better in principle, it has brought us 
little further.  
 A first problem on this track is that there is no well established theory about human needs 
and capacities. There is much speculation on this matter, some of which is rather plausible, 
but little empirical proof. Methodologically, it is extremely difficult to demonstrate what 
people 'really' need and can.  
 The currently most cited theory is Maslow's (1964) need hierarchy. According to this 
theory the most pressing need in human life is to overcome some basic deficiencies: first 
organic deficiencies such as hunger, and next socio-psychological needs like safety, belon-
ging and esteem. Beyond these 'deficiency needs', 'growth needs' would prevail. That means 
that people need meaningful challenges that fit their capacities and involve ongoing 
development.  
 At the level of deficiency needs, this theory allows some specification of necessary living 
conditions. The gratification of organic needs requires that there is a production system that 
provides 'food' and 'shelter'. Required minimum levels can be fairly well specified in this 
case. Things become more difficult where the socio-psychological needs are concerned. 
There is much variation in the way societies provide 'safety', 'belongingness' and 'esteem', and 
it is difficult to define minima or compare performance. What is for instance the minimum 
required degree of belongingness? Are these needs better gratified in the traditional stem 
family than in the modern nuclear family? Things become even more complicated where 
'growth needs' are concerned, which concern the use and development of capacities. These 
needs are too varied to allow the specification of satisfiers. At best one can say that gratifi-
cation of such needs requires a considerable degree of 'freedom' and 'variety' in society 
(Veenhoven 1996b). Again it is hardly possible to indicate minimum and maximum levels. 
 In fact, current input indicators have little scientific ground. The assumptions about the 
good life rather root in bad experience and in ideology. Present QOL indicators typically 
reflect Western remembrance of poverty and inequality. Positively they reflect Western 
Enlightened creed.  
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2.2.2     Output approach: 'apparent' quality-of-life 
By lack of a theory from which we can deduct necessary living conditions, we must therefore 
resort to the other approach and assess inductively what societal conditions appear to be 
livable. The question is than how livability manifests itself. 
 The flourishing of plants or animals in a given ecological environment is usually 
measured by their functioning as apparent in growth, adequacy of behavior and absence of 
disease. Successful procreation is also seen as a sign of good functioning.  
 Can the flourishing of humans in a social environment be measured by the same criteria? 
To some extent yes. Human thriving also manifests physically, particularly in good health 
and a long life. Therefore, we can induce the quality-of-life in a nation from the health of its 
citizens. 
 The flourishing of humans involves more than biological functioning alone. Unlike plants 
and animals, humans can reflect on themselves and their situation. The fit between their 
needs and capacities with the provisions and requirements of society is therefore also 
reflected in their judgments. As such we can also infer quality-of-life in a nation from the 
citizen's appraisals of life. 
 
The two approaches to the measurement of quality-of-life in nations are summarized in 
scheme 2. In the next paragraphs we shall consider the manifestations of apparent quality in 
more detail. First we shall review current measures of 'health' and 'appraisal', and then 
propose a new measure that combines both. 
 
 
3        CURRENT INDICATORS OF APPARENT QUALITY-OF-LIFE IN NATIONS 
 
Inferring quality-of-life from 'health' and 'appraisal of life' is less easy than it seems. What do 
these terms mean precisely? Can these matters be measured, in principle and in practice? In 
this paragraph I will review current indicators and their usefulness for this purpose. The 
review is summarized in scheme 3. It will appear that only a few indicators qualify. 
 
3.1      Measures of 'health' in nations 
As in the case of plants and animals, the flourishing of humans can be judged by their bio-
physiological functioning; in other words by their 'health'. We cannot say that somebody lives 
well if s/he is weak, impaired or ill and certainly not if s/he is dead. The concept of health 
covers biological functioning at large. Specific health concepts concern specific aspects of 
human functioning. 
 
3.1.1   Measures of physical health  
The analogy with flourishing of plants applies best where mere bio-physiological functioning 
is concerned, also called 'physical health'. Physical health of organisms can be defined in two 
ways: firstly by absence of disease or impairment, secondly by signs of good functioning, 
such as energy or resilience. The former aspect of bio-physiological functioning is referred to 
as 'negative health', the latter as 'positive health'. The less negative and the more positive the 
physical health of citizens, the more livable the country apparently is. 
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Negative health can be measured by the incidence and severity of impairments and disease. 
That sounds again easier than it is. Medical statistics say more about medical consumption 
than about illness. The available figures on illness are typically limited to 'incidence' and do 
not inform us about 'severity'. Moreover, medical statistics typically concern 'specific' health 
defects and mostly allow no view on the 'overall' health situation in a country. Some attempts 
have been made to characterize overall health in nations, but unfortunately these are as yet 
not sufficiently standardized to allow international comparison. 
 
Positive health can be measured by performance tests and by subjective reports about 
feelings of health. The latter indicators typically concern overall health. In several Western 
nations periodical health surveys monitor health feelings. Though the items used are quite 
diverse, some do allow international comparison in a sizable number of nations. At this 
moment the best source is the subjective health item in the World Value Survey.  
 
Life-expectancy The citizen's health can also be measured by their longevity. The number of 
years people live is assessed on the basis of civil registration. This is no problem for the 
generations that have passed away. For the living we must do with estimates. Life-
expectancy is estimated on the basis of observed survival rates in age-cohorts. Obviously, 
life-expectancy differs by age. Average length of life in a country is commonly expressed in 
'life-expectancy' at birth. 
 The quality of data on life-expectancy is quite good. Most present day nations have fairly 
reliable mortality statistics. These statistics show considerable differences between present 
day nation states. Life-expectancy is currently lowest in Upper Volta (about 30) and highest 
in Japan (79.5). Because mortality statistics cover considerable time periods, they also show 
progress and decline: for instance a drop in life-expectancy in the former second world 
(communist) countries in the 1970's, and a rise in first world nations (UN 1995). 
 
Healthy life-expectancy Long living is not necessarily healthy living. Life-expectancy may be 
high in a nation' but average health low. Extra years may be bought at the cost of a lot of 
illness. Therefore, health in nations is measured by the average number of years people live 
free from chronic illness (Robine & Ritchie, 1991).  
 Healthy life-expectancy has been measured in different ways. As yet, there is little 
comparable nation data on this matter. 
 
 
3.1.2    Measures of mental health  
Instead of focusing on 'bio-physiological' functioning, one can also consider the adequacy of 
'socio-psychological' functioning. This is what commonly is referred to as 'mental health'. 
When used in the context of livability, the reasoning is that the better a society fits with 
human needs and possibilities, the less it drives its members mad.  
 There is nothing wrong with this idea, but there are great problems in its operationa-
lization. It is not easy to establish who is mentally 'ill' or not. Cross national comparison is 
hampered by differences in manifestations of psychological disturbance, as well as in 
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definition and registration. This limits the use of this indicator to countries which are cul-
turally very similar. 
 Comparable national data on this matter are scarce, and limited in fact to the Western 
world. The data that is available concern 'negative' mental health: that is incidence of 
psychological disturbances. As in the case of physical health, most figures are on curation 
rather than on disturbance as such. Again morbidity statistics do not reflect 'overall' mental 
health, but the incidence of specific syndromes such as depression, anxiety and stress. A 
good review of data and their limitations can be found in Murphy (1982). 
 As in the case of physical health, the best indicators of overall mental health in a given 
country come from survey studies. Most health surveys inquire about psychological 
complaints and compute sum scores on the basis of these. Unfortunately, there is as yet too 
little uniformity in the data for meaningful comparison between countries. 
 
3.2       Measures of 'life appraisal' in nations 
Next to mere 'functioning', the thriving of humans can also be inferred from their 'appraisals'. 
Humans can apprehend their situation. Like other higher animals (but unlike plants) they 
experience affects. These affective appraisals are highly indicative for the quality-of-life. The 
very biological function of these faculties is to lead the organism to the best suited 
conditions4. Positive affect is generally indicative of good adaptation. Contrary to other 
animals humans are also able to appraise their situation cognitively. Positive judgment of life 
is generally indicative of good adaptation as well. 
 The degree to which inhabitants of a nation appraise their life positively can be assessed 
in different ways: indirectly by inferring from their behaviors and directly by asking how 
they feel about their life. For long social scientists have preferred the former method. By now 
it is clear that only the latter is viable for this purpose.  
 
3.2.1   Behavioral manifestations of malaise 
Traditionally, the quality-of-life in a nation was measured by the incidence of behaviors 
deemed indicative of despair. The more such behaviors observed, the less livable the country 
was supposed to be.  
 This approach does not require that people are fully aware of their malaise. Behavioral 
reactions can be affect driven or subconscious. Therefore, similar indicators are used for 
estimating well-being in animals. Aggression and self infliction are often mentioned as 
indicative of despair in captive animals. Among wild animals migration can sometimes be 
seen as a manifestation of discomfort in their earlier habitat. 
 
Despair  
Quality of life in nations has been measured by various manifestations of despair: mostly 
deviant behaviors such as use of drugs, aggression and excessive risk-taking, but also non-
offensive behaviors such as religious retreat. The problem with this approach is that these 
behaviors are at best partly linked to livability of society, and probably not equally much in 
all societies at all times. 
 Still, there is little doubt that suicide mostly signifies great personal despair. Hence 
suicide rates are often used as an indicator of quality-of-life in nations. This tradition dates 
back to Durkheim (1897). In this vein, the continuous rise of suicide in Western nations in 
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the 20th century has been interpreted as showing that modernization reduced the quality-of-
life. 
 There is probably some truth in the idea that low livability gives itself away in high 
suicide rates. Yet it is also clear that the incidence of suicide depends on many other things as 
well. In traditional societies such as Japan, suicide was in some situations a moral obligation. 
In present day Western society, suicide rates may rise because it is no longer taboo and 
because medical technology postpones natural death. It is also possible that modern people 
are less willing to endure suffering. As in the case of other despair behaviors, these effects 
are not equally great in all societies at all times. 
 Nevertheless, suicide is often used assess quality of life in nations. This is probably due 
to the fact that suicide is well documented. In most countries this cause of death has been 
systematically registered since long. Though the accuracy of registration varies somewhat 
between countries and through time, the data seem well comparable. The best available 
statistics are prepared by the World Health Organization (WHO 1987). The data show sizable 
differences. Around 1980 mortality by suicide was greatest in Hungary (" 460 per million) 
and lowest in the Philippines (" 9 per million). 
 
Protest and desert  
The quality-of-life in nations is also seen to reflect in protest-behaviors, in purposive political 
action (protest demonstrations, protest voting, etc) as well as in undirected rioting. In this 
line, the student revolts of the 1960's have been interpreted as showing declining quality-of-
life in modern nations. Here again the problem is that these behaviors do not necessarily 
reflect personal dissatisfaction with life. One can be quite happy, but still be concerned about 
social injustice. Studies on participants in the 1960's student rebellion illustrate that point 
(Keniston 1968). In fact, personal satisfaction may even facilitate engagement in social 
issues. Still another thing is that protests are typically concerned with specific aspects of 
society, and are therefore not very indicative of overall satisfaction with life. It is not easy to 
compare the incidence of protests and mass support across nations. The available figures 
seem to say more about registration than reality. 
 Emigration seems more indicative of quality-of-life in the nation. The decision to leave 
the country involves an overall evaluation of life in it, and that evaluation is likely to be 
negative; leaving hearth and home is not easy. In this vein, Ziegler & Britton (1981) showed 
that living conditions in emigration countries are typically poor. Yet, emigration may say 
more about opportunity to settle abroad than about the quality-of-life in the country. Also, 
expectations about a better life elsewhere do not necessarily mean that the quality-of-life in 
one's home country is poor. Further, emigration is not always due to dissatisfaction with life. 
Part of the migrants seek new horizons for positive reasons, and often migration comes about 
more or less unintendedly by involvement in love or work. Migration is a well documented 
phenomenon, and the figures are fairly comparable across nations.  
 
 
3.2.2    Self reported appraisals 
Though higher animals have the faculty of experience, they are typically unable to reflect on 
that experience and communicate it. We humans can. We can appraise how we feel about life 
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and can communicate the estimate. Therefore, human appraisals can in principle be assessed 
by interrogation.  
 Research has shown this is practically possible as well. Though self reports could be 
distorted in various ways, present interrogation techniques seem to measure it reasonably 
valid and reliable. On that basis a survey research tradition established since the 1960's.  
 Like in the earlier tradition of measuring quality-of-life by behavioral manifestations of 
malaise, the research on self reported appraisal started with despondencies as well. In the 
course of time emphasis shifted from specific patterns of experienced 'ill-being' to global 
subjective 'well-being'5.  
 
3.2.2.1 Experienced ill-beings 
In the sociological literature the concept of 'alienation' is commonly mentioned as state of ill-
being that indicates poor quality-of-life. In Social Psychology and Social-Medicine the 
concepts like 'anxiety', 'stress' and 'depression' are more common. Tough currently used, these 
indicators are too specific to characterize the degree to which people thrive encompassingly. 
The concepts denote only negative experience, and not positive experience. Yet in this 
context it is the balance of positive and negative experience that counts. Moreover, the 
concepts concern specific kinds of mental discomfort, rather than overall suffering.  
 
Is seen as something that results from a lack of fit between ways of life provided by a society 
and human potentials. That condition is believed to manifest in individual feelings of 
powerlessness and meaninglessness. There are many variations in this theme, some of which
come close to conceptions of mental health. 
 The incidence of subjective alienation in a society can be measured by means of surveys. 
Several questionnaires have been developed for that purpose. The currently most used is the 
Seeman Alienation Scale (Seeman, 1975). A major limitation of all these measures is that 
they do not involve a general judgment of life, but rather describe dissatisfaction in a cluster 
of life-aspects. Therefore, it is better not to use them for assessing overall quality-of-life. 
 In spite of much theorizing about alienation and society, there are hardly any comparative 
data. Even if we might want to judge livability of nations by the alienation of its citizens, we 
simply cannot. 
 
Above, these phenomena were already mentioned as manifestations of mental health. 
In that context, the concepts denoted impairment in the first place. In this context, the  
emphasis is on discomfort.  
 Like alienation, these mental states are seen as outcomes of poor fit between individual 
and society. Depression is commonly explained by lack of meaningful tasks and relation-
ships, while anxiety and stress are often mentioned as a results of too high social demands. 
Though there is probably some truth in that, we should realize that these discomforts can also 
occur in an otherwise good life. For instance, life in a dynamic nation may yield much 
satisfaction, though at the cost of some anxiety. 
 Prevalence of these kinds of mental ill-being is mostly assessed by survey research. There 
is a wealth of questionnaires on these matters, some of which are reported to have good 
psychometric qualities. Still, there is doubt about the comparability of such scores across 
time and culture. Report of such discomforts may be somewhat higher where they are more 
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recognized and accepted. For instance, the slight rise in depression reported in the USA 
(Lane 1996) could be due to greater awareness of mental ailments. 
 There is a lot of data on these matters of psychological ill-being. Yet the available data 
allow little opportunity for cross-national comparison. The few cross-national studies that did 
involve a sizable number of nations is limited to specific groups, such as employees of 
students. So again, it is simply not possible to measure the livability of nations in this way. 
 
 3.2.2.2   Overall happiness 
Assessing the appraisal of life in a nation requires that the total of experienced well-being is 
estimated. This sum of experience is denoted by the concept of 'happiness'. Happiness is a 
person's overall evaluation of his/her life as-a-whole.  
 
In this context it is worth distinguishing between judgments about 'society' and judgments 
about ones 'life in that society'. A society that is judged positively by its citizens is not  
necessarily a very livable one. The judgment can concern aspects that are very prominent 
in public discourse, but have little relevance for the actual enjoyment of life. Also, basically 
dissatisfied people can still be positive about their society, because they are unaware of its 
shortcomings and attribute their misery to other matters. The degree to which people flourish 
in a society can thus best measured by how they evaluate their own life, in other words by 
their personal satisfaction. 
 Personal satisfaction judgments can concern 'aspects-of-life', or one's 'life-as-a-whole'. 
Satisfaction with specific aspects of life such as 'work', 'marriage' or 'governments' says little 
about the general livability of a society. Most citizens may be satisfied with their work, but 
still be unhappy because their society offers little more. Also they can be satisfied with most 
aspects of life, but nevertheless judge their life-as-a-whole negatively; for instance because 
they miss something essential in it, i.e. 'freedom'. Still another complication is that aspects of 
life are not equally important in all societies at all times. 'Work' for instance is less central in 
most third world countries than in the homelands of the Protestant Ethic. For these reasons 
the focus on is here on 'overall'  personal satisfaction. 
 When we appraise how much we appreciate the life we live, we seem to use two sources 
of information, we estimate our typical affective experience to asses how well we feel 
generally (hedonic level of affect) and at the cognitive level we compare 'life as it is' with 
standards of 'how life should be' (contentment). The former affective source of information 
seems generally more important than the latter cognitive one (Veenhoven 1996a: 33-35). The 
word happiness is commonly used for these 'subtotals' as well as for the comprehensive 
appraisal. I use the terms 'overall' happiness or 'life-satisfaction' for the last judgment and 
refer to the affective and cognitive sub-appraisals as respectively 'hedonic level of affect' and 
'contentment'. Elsewhere, these concepts are delineated in more detail (Veenhoven 1984: ch 2). 
 
 
All these variants of happiness can be measured by self-report. Various questions have been 
developed for that purpose. For a review of items and scales see Veenhoven (1984: ch 4). The
most commonly used item is the single question: "Taking all together, how happy would you 
say you are? Very happy, fairly happy, not too happy or not at all happy?" 
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Another current question is how 'satisfied' one is with one's life-as-a-whole. Hedonic level is 
often measured by the ten item Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn 1969), which concerns 
occurrence of specific positive and negative affects in the past few weeks. This latter method 
seems best suited for cross-national comparison6. 
 Since the 1970's, happiness serves as a core variable in 'Quality-of-Life' surveys in many 
developed nations. In the reports, happiness is often presented as an indicator of livability, 
the happier the inhabitants are on average, the more livable the nation or region is presumed 
to be. 
 There is now a growing body of data on average happiness in nations7. Presently there are 
comparable surveys in some fifty nations. The data are brought together in the World 
Database of Happiness. 
 
3.3       Measuring happiness in nations 
Though currently used, these measures are much criticized. Three main objections are raised, 
which all imply that self reports of happiness provide no good basis for estimating apparent 
livability of nations. If true, these objections would be fatal to the new indicator proposed in 
this paper. Therefore I will now review that criticism in more detail. For more elaborate 
discussions of the measurement problems involved here see: Diener (1995), Headey & 
Wearing (1992) Saris & Veenhoven (in preparation), and Veenhoven (1993, 1996a). 
 
3.3.1   Validity of happiness self reports   
The first objection is that responses to questions about happiness do not adequately reflect 
how people really feel about their life. Several reasons have been suggested.  
 One of the misgivings is that most people have no opinion about their happiness. They 
would be more aware of how happy they are expected to be, and report that instead. Though 
this may happen incidentally, it appears not to be the rule. Most people know quite well whe-
ther or not they enjoy life. Eight out of ten Americans think of it every week. Responses on 
questions about happiness tend to be prompt. Non-response on these items is low; both 
absolutely (" 1%) and relatively to other attitudinal questions. `Don't know' responses are 
infrequent as well. 
 A related assertion is that respondents mix up how satisfied they actually are, with how 
satisfied other people think they are, given their life-situation. If so, people considered to be 
well off would typically report to be happy, and people regarded as disadvantaged should 
avow themselves unhappy. That pattern does occur, but it is not general. For instance, in The 
Netherlands good education is seen as required for a good life, but the best educated appear 
slightly less happy. 
 Another objection concerns the presence of systematic bias in responses. It is assumed 
that questions on happiness are interpreted correctly, but that the responses are often false. 
People who are actually dissatisfied with their life would answer that they are contented. 
Both ego-defense and social-desirability are said to cause such distortions. This bias is seen 
to manifest itself in over-report of happiness; most people claiming to be happy, and most 
perceiving themselves as happier than average. Another indication of bias is seen in the 
finding that psycho-somatic complaints are not uncommon among the happy. These observa-
tions are correct, but the findings allow other interpretations as well. Firstly, the fact that 
more people say to be happy does not imply over-report. It is quite possible that most people 
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are truly satisfied with life. When living conditions are not too bad this is in fact quite 
probable. Secondly, there are also good reasons why most people think that they are more 
satisfied than average. One such reason is that we underestimate happiness of our fellow-
man, because misery is more salient than prosperity. Thirdly, the occurrence of head-aches 
and worries among the satisfied does not prove response distortion. Life can be a sore trial 
some times, but still be satisfying on a balance. The proof of the pudding is in demonstrating 
the response distortion itself. Some clinical studies have tried to do so by comparing 
responses to single direct questions with ratings based on depth interviews and projective 
tests. The results are generally not much different from responses to single direct question 
posed by an anonymous interviewer. 
 Elsewhere the surmised flaws of self reported happiness have been checked in more 
detail. See Veenhoven (1984: chapter 3) and Headey & Wearing (1992: ch 3). None of them 
was corroborated as yet. 
 
3.3.2     Significance of average happiness   
The second objection is are that happiness does not reflect real quality of life. This objection 
has two variants: one variant holds that happiness is merely a matter of perceived advantage 
and the other that it is a mere matter of outlook. 
 
Relative? The first variant holds that happiness judgments draw on comparison within the 
nation, and can therefore not meaningfully compared across nations. This view is based on 
the theory that happiness results from social comparison. Some often cited investigations 
claim support for this theory. Easterlin (1974) saw the theory proved by his observation that 
happiness is as high in poor countries as it is in rich countries. Brickman et al (1978) claim 
proof in their observation that lottery-winners are no more satisfied with life than paralysed 
accident victims. Elsewhere, I scrutinized these sensational claims (Veenhoven 1991, 1995). 
The results of that enquiry can be summarized as follows: 
 First of all, average happiness is clearly not the same in poor and rich nations. Neither are 
accident victims equally satisfied as lottery winners. The differences may be smaller than one 
might have thought, but they exist undeniably. 
 Some other implications of theory that happiness is relative failed an empirical test as 
well. One such implication is that changes in living-conditions, to the better or the worse, do 
not have a lasting effect on happiness. However, there is good evidence that we do not adjust 
to everything; for instance, we don't adjust to the misfortune of having a handicapped child or 
the loss of a partner. 
 Another implication is that earlier hardship favors later happiness. This hypothesis does 
not fit the date either. For example, survivors of the Holocaust were found to be less satisfied 
with life than Israelis of the same age who got off scot-free. 
 A last empirical check to be mentioned is the correlation with income. The theory that 
happiness is relative predicts a strong correlation in all countries, irrespective of their wealth. 
Income is a salient criterion for social comparison, and we compare typically with 
compatriots. Again, the prediction is not confirmed by the data. The correlation is high in 
poor countries but low in rich ones. 
 The theory that happiness is 'relative' assumes that happiness is a purely cognitive matter 
and does not acknowledge affective experience. It focuses on 'wants' and neglects 'needs'. 
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Contrary to wants, needs are not relative. An alternative 'affective' theory is that we infer 
happiness from how we feel generally. If we feel fine, we gather that we must be satisfied. If 
we feel lousy most of the time we conclude we must be dissatisfied. Unlike conscious 
comparisons between ideal and reality, affects are largely unreasoned experiences, that 
probably signal the degree to which basic needs are met. The evidence for this theory is 
mounting. It denotes that happiness ratings reflect something universal, that can be 
meaningfully compared cross-culturally.  
 
Folklore? A second variant of the insignificance objection is that happiness reflects the domi-
nant view-on-life, rather than actual quality-of-life in a country. In this view, happiness-
ratings reflect local 'folklore'. Comparing happiness reports would hence be equating apples 
and pears. 
 The theory of happiness behind this argument is cognitive as well. Happiness is seen as a 
judgment that depends on socially constructed frames of reference, which are supposed to be 
culturally unique. This relativistic theory found support in unexpected differences in average 
happiness between nations, such as low happiness in France and the high level in the USA. 
The idea was also nourished by the finding that average happiness remained at the same level 
in postwar USA, in spite of a doubling of the national income. 
 Elsewhere I put this theory to several tests (Veenhoven 1992b: 66-79, 1994, 1995). One 
implicated hypothesis is that differences in average happiness are unrelated to variation in 
objective quality of life. Five such differences were considered: economic affluence, social 
equality, political freedom and intellectual development. These nation-characteristics 
explained 78% of the differences in average happiness in a 28 nation set. Further, there are 
examples of change in average happiness following improvement and decline of quality-of-
life in the country. 
  One also considered the residual variances in regression charts. If French national 
character would tend to understate happiness and the American way to overstatement, we can 
expect to find the French less happy than predicted on the basis of objective welfare and 
Americans more happy than their situation justifies. No such patterns appeared.  
 Still another test involved the analysis of happiness among migrants. If happiness reflects 
the quality of the conditions one lives in, the happiness of migrants in a country must be close 
to the level of autochthons. If happiness were a matter of socialized outlook, the happiness of 
migrants should be closer to the level in their motherland. The former prediction appeared 
true, the latter not. 
 
3.3.3     Comparability of happiness across countries   
Methodological objections involve various claims about differential distortion in responses to 
questions about happiness. Several of these assertions have been tested empirically 
(Veenhoven 1993, 1996a). Again, the results are negative as yet. 
 The most common objection holds that differences in language hinder comparison. 
Words like `happiness' and `satisfaction' would not have the same connotations in different 
tongues. Questions using such terms would therefore measure slightly different matters. That 
hypothesis was checked by comparing the rank-orders produced by three kinds of questions 
on the overall appreciation of life-as-whole: a question about `happiness', a question about 
`satisfaction' with life and a question that invites to a rating between `best-' and `worst 
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possible life'. The rank-orders appeared to be almost identical. Next, responses on questions 
on happiness and satisfaction in two bi-lingual countries were compared. This did not show 
linguistic bias either. 
 A second objection is that responses are to questions are distorted by social desirability, 
and that such biases differ across cultures. One of the manifestations would be more avowal 
of happiness in countries where happiness ranks high in the value-hierarchy. That latter claim 
was inspected by checking whether reported happiness is indeed higher in countries where 
hedonic values are most endorsed. This appeared not to be the case. As a second check, it 
was also inspected whether reports of general happiness deviate more from feelings in the 
past few weeks in these countries; the former measure being more vulnerable for desirability 
distortion than the latter. This appeared not to be the case either. 
 A third claim is that convention in communication distort the answers dissimilarly in 
different countries. For instance, collectivistic orientation would discourage `very' satisfied 
responses, because modest self-presentation is more appropriate within that cultural context. 
 This latter hypothesis was tested by comparing happiness in countries differing in value-
collectivism, but found no effect in the predicted direction. The hypothesis failed several 
other tests as well. 
 A related claim holds that happiness is a typical Western concept. Unfamiliarity with it in 
non-Western nations is said to involve several effects; responses would be more haphazard, 
and uncertainty would press to choice for middle categories on response scales, which results 
in relatively low average scores. If so, more `don't know' and `no answer' responses can be 
expected in non-Western nations. However, that appeared not to be the case. The frequency 
of these responses is about 1% in all parts of the world. 
 All these claims imply that there will be little relationship between average happiness 
rating and real characteristics of the nations. Yet we have seen that country differences in 
economic prosperity, freedom, equality and schooling explained 78% of the differences in 
reported happiness. 
 
Possibly, there are some other distortions. Time will learn. For the time being, it seems that 
self reports of overall happiness can de meaningfully compared across nations.  
 
 
4          NEW SUMMARY-MEASURE OF APPARENT QUALITY-OF-LIFE IN NATIONS 
 
In recapitulation, quality-of-life in nations is measured in two ways: 1) assumed QOL, by 
presence of conditions deemed beneficial, such as affluence, freedom, learning, etc (assumed 
QOL), and 2) by the degree to which citizens thrive, as manifested in their health and 
happiness (apparent QOL). We have seen encompassing measures of assumed quality-of-life, 
the multi dimensional indexes which we reviewed in the introductory paragraph. As yet, we 
did not meet with a comprehensive measure of apparent quality-of-life. 
 We have only seen an encompassing measure of the health indicator of apparent quality 
of life. That is: healthy life-expectancy, which combines absence of disease and longevity. 
The review did not reveal a measure which combines health and happiness. This paper 
proposes such combination, which provides an all-encompassing measure of apparent 
quality-of-life. 
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4.1       Notion of long and happy living 
The 'apparent' livability of a nation can be measured by the degree to which its citizens live 
long and happily. The longer and happier the citizens live, the better the provisions and 
requirements of society apparently fit with their needs and capacities. 
  An evident advantage to measuring quality-of-life by longevity alone is that the subjects' 
appraisal of life is acknowledged. People may live long, but not happily. For instance, in a 
repressive nation where healthy lifestyle is enforced, or where blind medical technology 
stretches life too long. Likewise, an advantage to measuring quality-of-life by happiness 
alone is that the length-of-life is taken into account. People may live happy in a culture of 
irresponsible hedonism, where they indulge in drugs and risky sensations, but they won't 
enjoy that life very long. 
 In fairy tales the happy end is commonly described by the phrase 'and they lived long and 
happily ever after'. This phrase reflects common conviction that the good life manifests in a 
long and happy life. In this conception, that individual level notion of quality-of-life is 
aggregated to the nation level. Instead of the fairy tales hero, we consider the average citizen. 
 Compared to most notions of 'assumed' quality-of-life the concept is relatively 
uncontroversial. Most people will agree that it is good to live long and happily. Not for 
nothing the fairy tales with that happy end are so popular. 
 
 
 
4.2      Operationalisation in 'Happy-Life-Expectancy' (HLE) 
Empirical assessment requires information on average length-of-life and on average 
appreciation-of-life in the country. As noted, this information is available from two sources: 
1) civil registration of death, and 2) survey data on happiness. On the basis registrations of 
death we can estimate how long people live in a nation at a certain time. These data are of an 
'objective' nature, only an outsider can assess how long one lived. Surveys allow an estimate 
of how happy people are on average. This data is of a 'subjective' kind. Only the oneself 
knows whether one is happy or not. Combined, these sources of information can tell us how 
long and happily people live in a country. 
 Analogous to 'healthy' life-expectancy, this combination can be labeled as 'happy life-
expectancy'. In line with custom we will abbreviate to 'HLE'.  
 The idea of such an analogous measure was suggested by Anton Kunst, with whom I 
developed an earlier measure of happy life-expectancy (Kunst et al 1990). 
 
4.2.1   Computation 
'Healthy' life-expectancy is usually computed by detracting expected years in bad health from 
expected years of life, both estimates based on age specific information8 computed by 
multiplying 'standard' life-expectancy in years with average happiness as expressed on a scale 
ranging from zero to one. 
 
Formula: 
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Happy life-expectancy = standard life-expectancy x 0-1 happiness 
 
 
Examples  
Suppose that life-expectancy in a country is 50 years, and that the average score on a 0 to 10 step 
happiness scale is 5. Converted to a 0-1 scale, the happiness score is than 0,5. The product of 50 
and 0,5 is 25. So happy life-expectancy in that country is 25 years. This example characterizes 
most of the poor nations in the present day world. 
If life-expectancy is 80 years and average happiness 8, happy life-expectancy is 64 years (80 x 
0,8). This example characterizes the most livable nations in the present day world. 
 
Range 
Theoretically, this indicator has a broad variation. Happy life-expectancy is zero if nobody can 
live in the country at all, and will be endless if society is ideal and its inhabitants immortal. 
The practical range will be between about 20 and 75 years. Presently at least, life expectancy 
at birth in nations varies between 30 and 80, whereas average happiness is seldom lower than 0,4 
on a 0 to 1 scale and seldom higher than 0,8. 
Happy life-expectancy will always be lower than standard life-expectancy. It can equal real 
length of life only if everybody is perfectly happy in the country (score 1 on scale 0 to 1). This is 
clearly not possible. The highest level of happiness ever observed is 0,8 (Iceland 1990), which is 
probably close to the maximum. 
 
4.2.2    Interpretation 
High happy life-expectancy means that citizens live both long and happily, low happy life 
expectancy implies that the life of the average citizen is short and miserable. Medium values of 
happy life-expectancy in a country can mean three things: 1) both moderate length-of-life and 
moderate appreciation-of-life, 2) long but unhappy life, and 3) short but happy life. In this 
measure these three situations are treated alike. 
Metaphorically, the scores can be interpreted as the number of happy years the nation affords its 
citizens. 
 
4.2.3   Practical requirements 
Actual measurement of HLE requires that data on both happiness and life-expectancy is 
available for a sufficient number of nations. Another condition is that these components involve 
distinct information. 
 
Availability of data  
Availability is no problem for life-expectancy. This is known for all present day nations, and on 
a lot of countries there are also time-series which date back to more than a century (UNDY 
1995). 
Data on average happiness in nations is less abundant. Survey-research is relatively recent, and 
items on happiness appeared only until the 1970's. Still there are some 50 nations of which we 
know present happiness, and on a dozen we have time-series of one or more decades (World 
Database of Happiness). For the moment, that suffices for an exploration. In the coming decades 
happiness surveys will probably get established in most of the worlds nations. 
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Differentiation of components  
At the conceptual level there is a clear difference between life-expectancy and happiness, but 
does that difference appear at the empirical level as well? If life-expectancy and happiness 
coincide completely, we shall not get wiser by combining them. 
A look at the available data shows good differentiation. See scheme 4. On the left, the case of 
Nigeria (WAN) demonstrates that low length-of-life can go together with reasonable 
appreciation-of-life. To the right below, the Eastern European nations illustrate that the reverse 
occurs as well. Right on top we see that the nations with the highest life-expectancy (typically 
the developed nations) differ considerably in average happiness. 
 
 
5         FIRST DATA ON HAPPY LIFE-EXPECTANCY 
 
Life-expectancy in nations can be computed in several ways. The variant used here is life 
expectancy at birth. This implies that infant mortality has a considerable effect9. Data were 
obtained from the Un Demographic Yearbook (UN 1993, table 21). Happiness in nations can be 
assessed in different ways as well. As we have seen above, the most currently used question is a 
single item about how 'happy' one would say one is. Average scores on that question are 
available for 48 nations10. The Average life-satisfaction is available for 42 nations, and Affect 
Balance (the best choice) only for 39 nations. High intercorrelations suggest that these three 
indicators measure essentially the same thing11. 
Hence I will use the best available one for this exploration, that is: the happiness item. The data 
are presented on appendix 1. The first and the second column present respectively standard life-
expectancy and average happiness in these countries in the early 1990's. The third column 
displays the inclusive score of 'happy life-expectancy' (HLE). 
 
5.1      Level of happy life-expectancy in 48 nations early 1990's 
The bardiagram in scheme 5 presents the nations in order of their HLE score. The lowest scores 
appear in the two least developed nations in this set, that is in India and Nigeria, and in the 
formerly communist East European nations of Bulgaria and Belarus (White Russia). 
The highest scores are observed in rich West European nations, in particular in Iceland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Australia also qualifies well on the fifth place in this 
rankorder. 
In the middle we see four categories of nations. Firstly, the luckier East-European countries, such 
as former East Germany and Poland. Secondly, the economically expanding East Asian nations 
such as South Korea and Japan. Thirdly, the Latin American nations Brazil, Mexico, Chile and 
Argentina 12. A last category in the middle of the distribution is lagging West-European nations 
such as West-Germany and Spain. 
The range in this nation set is between 30 and 60 'happy years'. Probably the top of the present 
day world is better represented than the bottom in this collection. 
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5.2      Correlates of happy life-expectancy 
The next question is of course whether these differences in 'apparent' quality-of-life in nations 
have any correspondence with the earlier mentioned notions of 'assumed' quality-of-life. Is HLE 
higher in the nations that perform best on these standards? To answer that question we inspected 
the statistical relationship of happy life-expectancy with various nation-characteristics that are 
currently seen as required for a good life. From the limited number of indicators that are 
available for this broad nation set we selected the ones that denote cherished traits the most. 
 
5.2.1   Separate correlates 
Variables and findings are presented in scheme 6. The first column in that scheme denotes the 
nation characteristics considered. Detail about source and measurement is presented in appendix 
2. Correlations with happy life-expectancy are presented in the columns 2 and 3, in column 2 the 
zero order correlations and in column 3 partial correlations that control the effect of economic 
development as measured by GDP. The last column mentions the number of nations involved in 
these correlations. Due to missing values, the numbers differ considerably. As a result, the 
nation-set differs somewhat from variable to variable 
 
Expected relationships  
A first look at scheme 6 shows that several assumptions about livability features of nations are 
confirmed. Happy life-expectancy is indeed higher in the nations were people live most securely, 
and where the material level of living is highest. This is in agreement with common 'materialist' 
assumptions. 
Happy life-expectancy is also higher in the most free and individualistic nations, which is in line 
with 'liberal' expectation. The observed relationships with enlightenment and tolerance fit liberal 
view as well. 
HLE is also higher the more equal the nation, at least were gender equality and educational 
homogamy are concerned. This confirms current 'egalitarist' expectations. 
Further, we see a positive correlation with participation in voluntary organisations, which  
supports communitarist assumptions about livability. Yet we will see below that other findings 
are contrary to that view. 
These most livable nations are typically the most modern nations in the present day world. This 
will be no surprise for believers in progress, though it will annoy prophets of doom. 
 
Unexpected relationships  
Yet there are also findings that do not fit current assumptions. Firstly, HLE is not related to 
social security and income equality. This is contrary to common social-democratic assumption. 
Even more surprising in that context is the positive relationship with unemployment. This effect 
is caused by the former communist countries, where employment was still high at the time of the 
investigation. When these cases are omitted, we see no relationship. This may mean that 
unemployment has some positive consequences which balance out the negative ones13. 
Further we do not see significant correlations with the measures of trust and religiousness. This 
is contrary to current communitarist thinking. 
Noteworthy is also that HLE is not lower in nations characterized by military dominance and 
population pressure. Apparently, we can live with these conditions. 
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Control by economic affluence  
Several correlations are reduced to insignificance when economic prosperity is controlled. This 
is the case with social security, political freedom, social equality, social participation and trust. 
That can mean that these societal qualities have no independent effect, but it is also possible that 
this control procedure is too severe, in that common variance with economic prosperity is not 
necessarily all causation that matter. 
In one case there is evidence that the partial correlations are valid. This is the case of 'social 
security'. Cross temporal data have shown that life-expectancy and happiness did not rise more in 
the nations were state-welfare expanded most since the 1950's (Veenhoven & Ouweneel 1994). 
 
Effect size  
Probably, the observed correlations do not fully reflect the true effectsize. Themeasures are far 
from perfect, and will therefore be reduced by error. In this context it is worth reminding that this 
measure of happy life-expectancy is not the only possible one. A variant that measures the 
happiness component by Affect Balance might reveal somewhat stronger links in applied on the 
same nation set. 
Next to the size of these statistical relationships, we also considered their shape. In the case of 
economic prosperity we found a convex pattern, which is indicative of diminishing returns. 
The scattergram is presented on scheme 7. Similar shapes were observed in the relationship of 
HLE with urbanization, informatization and safety. Most of the patterns are more or less linear, 
for instance in the cases of gender equality, schooling, social participation and tolerance. This 
suggests that these societal qualities have not yet reached saturation levels. 
 
Causality  
One must realize that positive correlations do not prove that these nation qualities are conductive 
to long and happy living. The statistical relationships can also reflect effects of the latter on the 
former. For instance, a healthy and happy labor force is likely to generate more economic 
prosperity. Though it is unlikely that all correlations are fully caused that way, the real benefits 
of these alleged nation virtues could be more modest than the correlations suggest. 
 
5.2.2     Joint correlation 
Due to missing values we could not assess the joint effect of all the variables in scheme 6. The 
best we could do was compute variance explained by seven variables in 26 nations. These 
variables are: income per head, social security, political freedom, literacy and gender equality. 
Together these variables explained 70% of the variance in HLE in this dataset. The same 
variables explain even more variance in standard life-expectancy (84%) alone, but less in 
happiness separately (36%). When we consider rich nations apart, a different picture emerges. In 
that subset, the variables differentiate better with happy-life-expectancy than with mere life-
expectancy14. 
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These first results beg for a substantive explanation. Yet that would lead us too far. Let is 
therefore leave that matter for the moment, and focus on the implications for measuring quality-
of-life in nations. 
The first conclusion is than that many notions of 'assumed' quality-of-life coincide more or less 
with 'apparent quality-of-life'. This would suggest that current QOL-indexes measure about the 
same as the newly proposed HLE. Yet in other respects they work out differently: The second 
lesson is that not everything deemed beneficial does contribute to a longer and happier life. HLE 
appeared unrelated to state welfare effort, income equality and unemployment. It was neither 
related to military dominance and population pressure. This means that part of the items in 
current QOL-indexes rather reflect fantasies about the good life. 
The third point is that the relationships that do exist are not all linear. We found convex patterns 
in the relationships with economic affluence, freedom, urbanization, urbanization, informati-
zation and safety. This underlines the earlier point that ever more of the good is not always 
better. 
The forth thing to note is that not all correlations are equally strong. For instance, personal 
freedom seems more conductive to long and happy living than income equality. This underscores 
the earlier objection that current QOL-indexes do not acknowledge differences in importance of 
the merits they list. 
 
 
6          USEFULNESS OF HLE 
 
We started this paper with the quest for a comprehensive indicator of quality-of-life in nations. Is 
HLE the promised measure? Does it qualify as an equivalent to economist's GNP? Is it better 
than current QOL-indexes? Let us summarize its theoretical relevance, political appeal and 
practical usability, and recapitulate the differences with current QOL-indexes. 
 
6.1        Theoretical bearing 
HLE is a well interpretable indicator. Contrary to current QOL-indexes, it measures a clear 
phenomenon, that represents a specific quality concept in a comprehensive way. 
 
Clear denotation  
HLE measures the degree to which people live long and happily in a country at a certain time. As 
such the indicator has a clear substantive meaning. This is not the case with current QOL-
indexes. These reflect the degree to which some bunch of desiderata is met. Interpretation differs 
with contents of the bunch and is always uncertain. 
 
Conceptually specific  
The degree to which citizens live long and happily in a country denotes a specific conception of 
quality-of-life in society, also called 'livability'. It manifests societal output in 'apparent' thriving, 
not societal input assumed to be beneficial. Current QOL-indexes are conceptually less specific. 
Most do not distinguish between quality of society and quality-of-life in society. The few that 
claim to focus quality-of-life 'in' nations, still mingle items on 'input' and 'output', or 'assumed' 
and 'apparent' livability. 
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5.2.3  Significance for QOL-measurement
The correlations in scheme 6 showed that happy life-expectancy measures something different 
indeed. Though most of the assumed nation-qualities correlated well with happy life-expectancy, 
some did not. For instance not income equality, and unemployment. 
 
Inclusive  
Long and happy living of citizens is an all-encompassing manifestation of this specific quality-
of-life concept. Happy life-expectancy is hence a comprehensive measure of 'apparent' livability. 
Current QOL-indexes do not cover a conception inclusively. They typically provide a 
convenience sample of features deemed indicative of something good. 
 
6.2      Directional meaning 
As happy life-expectancy measures societal 'output' specifically, it does not mix means and ends. 
Therefore it provides more ground for policy evaluation. 
 
Focus on ends 
Happy life-expectancy denotes the degree to which end values are realized in society, and does 
not involve means. As such it is well suited to evaluate long term effects of social policy. Current 
QOL-indexes typically mix means and ends, such as 'healthcare' and 'health'. In policy-
evaluations this leads into contamination. When means are in the effect-measure, the measures 
indicates at best to what extent the instrumental goals are achieved. Not whether that serves any 
ultimate end. 
 
Gauge for means  
As happy life-expectancy is a measure of 'apparent' quality-of-life specifically, it can be used to 
calibrate notions of 'assumed' quality-of-life. As such it can inform social policy about the best 
means to create a livable society. 
In scheme 6 we have seen correlations between happy life-expectancy and several nation 
characteristics believed to be beneficial. Happy life-expectancy was indeed positively related to 
most of these, but not in equal terms. For instance, it related more to to gender equality than to 
income equality. This is worth knowing in setting priorities. 
Some of the believed features of livability were not related to happy life-expectancy at all, for 
instance not unemployment. So enforcing full employment will probably not add to long and 
happy living of the citizens, even though it may be still desirable from other points of view. 
Current QOL-indexes do not allow a reality correction of assumptions about the good life, 
because they are partly based on presumption themselves. Therefore they are of little help in 
selecting the best ways to a more livable society. At best they indicate success in the way 
followed. 
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6.3        Political appeal 
The end values happy life-expectancy refers to are fairly universally recognized and endorsed. 
Their appeal is likely to grow in the future. 
 
Universal value  
Long and happy living is a widely appreciated value. This appears not only in preference for 
tales that conclude this way, but also in the results of survey studies. Health and happiness are 
typically the most mentioned end values. There are good reasons to assume that adherence to 
these values is more or less implied in the human condition. Glorification of death and suffering 
may exist everywhere, but is mostly marginal. Happy life-expectancy appeals to the vast 
majority. 
 
Upcoming value  
The attractiveness of long and happy living is even likely to become greater in the future. 
Growing individualization adds to the value attributed to personal health and happiness. 
On the other hand, the traditional deficit measures loose relevance in the course of social 
progress. The more money, education and freedom we get, the less the attraction of more of the 
same is. A related development is that public demand diversifies when the most common 
deficiencies are satiated. This leads to more encompassing notions of progress as well. One of 
the manifestations of this trend is value shift to 'post materialism' in Western society (Inglehart, 
1990). 
 
6.4       Metric quality 
Next to its theoretical and political relevance, HLE seems to have good metric properties. The 
indicator combines good substantive validity, with good differential- and good concurrent 
validity. 
 
Substantive validity  
Happy life-expectancy is presumed to reflect the degree to which people live long and happily in 
a country. There is little reason to doubt it does. The life-expectancy component can hardly 
measure anything else than real longevity. At its worst it can measure that matter imperfectly, 
but the problem is then reliability rather than validity. There are more qualms about the validity 
of the happiness component. However, we have seen that none of the misgivings has been 
proven true as yet. 
 
Discriminative validity  
Happy life-expectancy differentiates well. As we have seen in scheme 5, happy life-expectancy 
varies between 32 and 62 in this nationset. Probably, scores below 32 could be observed in some 
countries that are not included in this dataset. Differentiation is not haphazard, but systematic. 
 
Concurrent validity 
The correlations in scheme 6 showed sensible relationships with some nation qualities. Typical, 
the better the living conditions in a country, the higher the happy life-expectancy. Together, 
affluence, literary, freedom and gender equality explained 70% of the variance in happy life-
expectancy in nations. This indicates substantive relevance as well. 
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6.5       Limitations 
HLE is a longterm output measure, which is not bound to specific inputs. As such it is of little 
help in daily piecemeal decision making. Next to this substantive limitation there is the practical 
problem that data on happiness are limited as yet. 
 
Substantive limitations  
The strengths of HLE are also limitations. Because it is a long term measure, it reacts slowly. 
Because it is an ultimate output measure, it tell us little about required input. HLE reacts slowly, 
because environmental change affects life-expectancy typically in the long run, at least if no 
disaster is involved. The happiness component is probably more sensitive to change, but still 
happiness levels tend to be fairly stable. So, decreasing livability of society will manifest in HLE 
only with considerable delay. As such it is more analogous to climate change than to the 
weather. 
A related problem is that the reason for changes in HLE will not always be obvious. Because it is 
an ultimate output measure, it tells us little about required input. As many effects can possibly be 
involved, there will always be discussion on why livability changes the way it does. 
Consequently, the measure is not suited for early warning or for choosing between specific 
policy options. It strengths is in the evaluation of course in retrospect. 
 
Data shortage  
At this moment, a more practical problem is in the required data on average happiness. The data-
quality is less than ideal, and the quantity is still limited. Not only is the number of countries 
small as yet, but also is there as yet little sight on the development of time series. 
 
 
7          CONCLUSION 
 
Quality-of-life in nations can be assessed by prevalence of conditions deemed beneficial 
(assumed quality-of-life) and by the degree to which citizens thrive (apparent quality-of-life). 
The former conception is more problematic than the latter. Flourishing of people in a nation 
manifests most completely in the degree to which they live long and happily. This can be 
measured comprehensively by combining registration data on length-of-life with survey data on 
appreciation-of-life in nations. The resulting scores of 'happy life-expectancy' provide a useful 
social indicator. 
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Scheme 1 
Some current measures of quality-of-life in nations 
Criteria for QOL in nations  Examples of QOL indexes 
 Index of 
Social Progress 
(ISP) 
(Estes 1984) 
Index of well-being 
 
 
(Kacapyr 1996) 
Quality-of-life 
index 
 
(Narrol 1984) 
Human  
Development Index 
(HDI) 
(UNPD 1995) 
Economic affluence  x  x    x 
State welfare  x    x   
Education   x    x  x
Public health  x    x  x 
Social equality  x      (x)15 
Peacefulness   x  x  x  
Physical habitability   x  x     
Social stability  x    x   
Cultural diversity  x    x   
Lifestyle      x   
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Scheme 2 
Indicators of livability: summary scheme 
  
 
 
 
 
unobserved 
concept 
 QUALITY-OF LIFE IN NATION 
 (or livability of nation) 
 
 fit between 
 provisions and requirements of society 
 and 
 needs and capacities of citizens 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
observable 
manifestations 
INPUT-indicators: 
 
Presence of conditions 
deemed likely to fit with 
citizens' needs and capaci-
ties, such as: 
 
* economic affluence 
  f.e. GNP 
 
* political freedom 
  f.e. legal rights 
 
* social equality 
  f.e. income equality 
 
* access to knowledge 
  f.e. literacy rate 
 
* etc..... 
 OUTPUT-indicators 
 
Flourishing of citizens as 
apparent in average: 
 
 
 
* good health 
  - physical 
  - mental 
 
* positive appraisal of life   
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
comprehensive 
indicators 
various sum-scores: 
f.e. HDI 
f.e. ISP 
  
Happy Life-Expectancy  
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Scheme 3 
Indicators of apparent quality-of-life in nations 
  
 
manifestation of human thriving  substantive  comparability  availability 
       significance across nations of data 
  
 
Health 
Physical health 
* medical consumption   --     +   + 
*  prevalence of disease   +   -   + 
*  subjective health    +   +   + 
*  life-expectancy    +   ++            ++ 
 *  healthy life-expectancy  ++   -   - 
Mental health 
*  curative consumption   --     --     - 
*  prevalence of disturbances  +   "   --
 
 
Appraisal of life 
Behavioral manifestations of malaise 
* Despair 
 * suicide     -   +            ++ 
 * escapism    -   --     - 
* Protest and desert 
 * protest behaviors   --     --     -- 
 *  migration    -   -   - 
Avowed appraisals 
* Experiences of ill-being 
 * alienation    -   -   -- 
 * anxiety, depression, stress  +   -   - 
* Overall well-being 
 * mood level    ++   +   + 
 * contentment     +   +   + 
  * overall happiness   +   +   + 
 
++ = very good   + = good    - = insufficient    -- = bad 
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scheme 4 
Plot of average length-of-life by appreciation-of-life 
in 48 nations early 1990's 
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Data: Appendix 1 
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Scheme 5 Happy Life-Expectancy in 48 nations 1990 
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Data: Appendix 1 
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Scheme 6 
Correlates of Happy Life-Expectancy 
i n 48 nations 1990 
 
nation characteristics    correlation with HLE   N 
 
             zero order affleunce 
           controlled 
 
Material affluence 
Income per head:  
* purchasing power 1989    +.78**   ---                   43 
Standard of living 
* malnutrition: % < 2500 calories   -.41*   +.07  42 
* % without safe water    -.65**                      -.13  39 
* rooms per dwelling    +.46*   +.04  42 
 
Security 
Physical safety 
* murder rate; medical registration   -.48**                      -.32  39 
* lethal accidents: medical registration  -.67**                      -.55**                     39 
* maternal deaths     -.38*   -.20  47 
Legal security 
* incidence of corruption    -.81**                      -.46*  35 
Social security 
* state expenditures in % GDP   +.57   +.15  34 
 
Freedom 
Political freedom 
* respect of political rights    +.55**   +.14  47 
* respect of civil rights    +.60**   +.18  47 
Personal freedom 
* of marriage: acceptance divorce   +.35   +.16  42 
* of procreation: abortion available   +.32   -.07  38 
* of sexuality: acceptance of homosexuality +.72**   +.38*  42 
* to dispose of own life: acceptance suicide +.43*   +.16  42 
Self-perceived freedom 
* in life      +.49**   +.25  42 
* at work      +.67**   +.54**  41 
 
Social equality 
Income inequality 
* dispersion in income statistics   -.10   +.07  41 
* dispersion in self rated family income  -17   +.05  40 
Gender inequality 
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* woman empowerment index   -.68**                     -.19  37 
Class difference 
* educational homogamy    -.43   -.30  27 
 
Cultural climate 
Knowledge 
* Education 
 * % literate     +.45**   +.21  47 
 * school enrolment ratio   +.37   +.43*  38 
Information 
* newspapers pc     +.46*   -.04  32 
* TV receivers pc     +.57**   -.18  42 
Beliefs 
* belief in God     +.24   +.30  37 
* religious identification    +.11   +.12  41 
* religious participation    -.03   +.14  38 
Value orientation 
* individualism     +.74**   +.53  32 
* power distance     -.63**                      -.33  32 
* masculinity     -.13   -.40  32 
* uncertainty avoidance    -.28   -.36  32 
 
Social climate 
Tolerance 
* negative attitudes to social categories  -.67**                      -.43*  38 
Trust 
* trust in family     +.27   +.32  42 
* trust in compatriots    +.11   +.25  42 
* trust in institutions    C.05   +.14  30 
Social participation 
* in work: unemployment    +.40**   +.41*  42 
* in voluntary associations: memberships  +.53**   +.22  34 
Peacefulness 
* military dominance in society   -.19   -.27  41 
* military expenditure    -.16   -.18  41 
 
 
Population pressure 
Population density     -.03   +.04  42 
Population growth     +.16   -.07  39 
 
Modernization 
Urbanization      +.57**   +.24  40 
Industrialization     -.74**                      -.24  30 
Informatization     +.80**   +.18  42 
 
 
 
Individualization     +.68**   +.12  38 
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nation characteristics    correlation with HLE   N  
             zero order  affleunce 
          controlled
Scheme 6 continued 
Scheme 7 
Plot of economic affluence and Happy Life-Expectancy 
in 46 nations early 1990's 
Buying power (per capita , in $)
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Data: Appendix 1 and 2 
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Scheme 8 
Plot of  freedom and Happy Life-Expectancy 
in 39 nation 1990 
Freedom factor (political + personal + perceived)
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Data: Appendix 1 and 2 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table of life-expectancy, happiness and happy life-expectancy 
in 48 nations early 1990's 
 
Nation Average 
length 
of life  
in years 
Average 
appreciation 
of life 
scale 0 to 1 
Happy 
life 
expectancy 
'happy years' 
code 
 
name    
RA Argentina  72,10   0,690*  49,75 
AUS Australia 77,60 0,767 59,49 
A Austria  76,20  0,733  55,88 
WY Belarus (White Russia)  69,80  0,487  33,97 
B Belgium  76,40  0,770  58,83 
BR Brazil  66,30  0,647  42,87 
GB Britain  76,20  0,760  57,91 
BG Bulgaria  71,20  0,443  31,57 
CND Canada  77,40  0,683  52,89 
RCH Chile  70,00  0,678*  47,37 
CN China  68,50  0,640*  43,84 
CZ Czecho Slovakia (former)  71,30  0,557  39,69 
DK Denmark  75,30  0,787  59,24 
EW Estonia  69,30  0,527  36,50 
SF Finland  75,70  0,697  52,74 
F France  76,90  0,720  55,37 
D Germany (former West)  76,00  0,680  51,68 
DDR Germany (former East)  72,00  0,653  47,04 
G Greece  77,60  0,590  45,78 
H Hungary  69,00  0,573  39,56 
IS Iceland  78,20  0,793  62,04 
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IND India  60,40   0,603*  36,44 
IRL Ireland  75,30  0,787  59,24 
IL Israel  76,50  0,627  47,94 
I Italy  77,50  0,660  51,15 
J Japan  79,50  0,666  53,00 
LR Latvia  69,10  0,508  35,01 
LT Lithuania  70,40  0,497  35,90 
L Luxembourg  75,70  0,727  55,01 
MEX Mexico  70,80  0,650  46,02 
NI Northern Ireland  74,00  0,763  56,49 
NZ New Zealand  75,50  0,722  54,86 
NL Netherlands  77,40  0,797  61,66 
WAN Nigeria  50,40  0,643  32,42 
N Norway  76,90  0,743  57,16 
RP Philippines  66,30  0,693  45,97 
PL Poland  71,10  0,657  46,69 
P Portugal  74,60  0,610  45,51 
RO Romania  69,90  0,543  37,98 
SU Russia  67,60  0,510  34,48 
ZA South Africa  62,90  0,607  38,16 
ROK South Korea  71,10  0,620  44,08 
SLO Slovenia  71,00  0,540  38,34 
SP Spain  77,60  0,680  52,77 
S Sweden  78,20  0,787  61,52 
CH Switzerland  78,00  0,767  59,80 
TR Turkey  66,50   0,693*  46,11 
US United States of America  76,00         0,760  57,76 
 
 Life-expectancy: Data from UN Demographic Yearbook 1993 
 Happiness: Data from World Database of Happiness (update 1996), tables 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b 
 
 
 
 * Probably too high. Score based on samples in which poor rural population was under represented  
Appendix 1 continued 
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Appendix 2 
Nation characteristics used in correlational analysis  
 
 
VARIABLES  N SOURCE 
Characteristic Measurement   
  
 
        
Affluence     
 
Income per head    
Real GDP p/c 1989 purchasing power p/c 43 Human Development Report 1992 table 116 
 
Standard of living   World bank Atlas ?? 
Malnutrition  daily calories, degree < 250017 42 Kurian 1992 table 192 
No safe water % without access to safe water18  38 Kurian 1992 table 194 
Electricity  % homes with electricity  32 Kurian 1992 table 185 
Living space rooms per dwelling19  40 Kurian 1992 table 183 
 
 
Security 
 
Physical safety 
Murder rate  medical registration of cause of death 39 UN Demographic Yearbook 1993 table 21 
Lethal accidents medical registration of cause of death 39 UN Demographic Yearbook 1993 table 21 
Maternal deaths  medical registration of cause of death 47 PAI 1995 table 17 
 
Legal security 
Corruption  ratings by businessmen and journalists  34 Transparency International 1995 
 
Social security (state-welfare)    
Welfare rights index of entitlement (1980)  18 Esping-Anderson 1990 table 2.2 
Welfare expenditures % GDP on social security (1989)  34 ILO 199?? table 3 
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Appendix 2 continued          
        
Freedom     
 
Political freedom expert ratings:  Karantnycky 1995 
Political rights - 9 item index: f.e. free elections  47  
Civil rights - 11 item index: f.e. free press  47  
 
Personal freedom    
Freedom of marriage    
* public acceptance of:    
  * divorce public opinion; single survey question 42 World values Study 2, item 310 
Freedom of sexuality    
* public acceptance of:    
  * homosexuality public opinion; single survey question 42 World Values Study 2, item 307 
  * prostitution public opinion; single survey question 42 World Values Study 2, item 308 
Freedom of reproduction    
* legal/practical restrictions to:    
  * abortion expert rating of restrictive policy 37 PAI 1995 
Freedom to dispose over ones own life    
* public acceptance of:    
  * suicide public opinion, single survey question 40 World Values Study 2, item 313 
 
Perceived freedom    
Perceived general freedom in life public opinion, single survey question 42 World values Survey 2, item 95 
Perceived freedom at work public opinion, single survey question 41 World values Survey 2, item 117 
 
 
 
Social equality    
 
Income inequality    
Dispersion of income income statistics 
* ratio highest 20% to lowest 20%  28 Human Development Report 1955 table 12 
Dispersion of reported family incomes 
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*  standard deviation survey question about family income 40 World Values Study 2, item 36320 
 
Gender-equality    
3 item 'Gender Empowerment Measure' female share in education, work and income 35 UNHDR 1995 table 3.5 
 
Class-difference    
Education-homogamy survey data on education of spouse 27 Smits et al 1996:48 
 
        
        
        
        
Cultural climate    
 
Knowledge 
Education     
* literacy; % illiterate total male and female literacy 47 World development Report 1995 table 1 
* school-enrolment ratio gross enrolment ratio 36 World development report 1995 table 3.1 
        
Information:  
* media attendance21    
 * reading of newspapers newspaper circulation p/c 32 Kurian 1992 table 218 
 * television watching television receivers p/c22 42 Kurian 1992 table 214 
 
 
Beliefs      
Belief in God public opinion; single survey question  37 World Values Study 2, item 175 
Religiousness    
 * identify as religious average response to survey question 41 World Values Study 2, item 151 
 * religious participation average response to survey question 38 World Values Study 2, item 147 
 
Values      
Hofstede dimensions 
 * individualism opinion IBM employees 32 Hofstede 1990, table 3.1 
 * power distance opinion IBM employees 32 Hofstede 1990, table 2.1 
 * masculinity opinion IBM employees 32 Hofstede 1990, table 4.1  
 
 
 
 *  uncertainty avoidance opinion IBM employees 32 Hofstede 1990, table 5.1 
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Social climate 
 
Tolerance     
Rejection of social categories public opinion; 14 item index 38 World Values Study 2, items 69-82 
 
Trust       
Trust in institutions public opinion; 15 item index 30 World Values Study 2, items 272-285 
Trust in people   
 * trust in family public opinion; single question 40 World Values Study 2, item 340 
 * trust in compatriots public opinion; single question 40 World Values Study 2, item 341 
 
Social participation    
In voluntary organizations:    
*  memberships survey report: 16 item index 34 World Values Study 2, items 19-36 
In work life 
*  unemployment labor force surveys and registrations 42 ILO 1995, table 9 
 
Peacefulness 
Military dominance    
* militarisation of society soldier/civilian ratio 41 Kurian 1992 table 41 
* military expenditure  expenditures in % GDP 41 Kurian 1992 table 43 
        
        
        
Modernization    
Urbanization % population in urban area  41 Kurian 1992 table 18 
Industrialization % earned in agriculture 30 Kurian 1992 table 84 
Informatization telephones per capita 42 Kurian 1992 table 167 
Individualism-collectivism expert rating .. Diener 1994 table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population pressure    
Population density persons per square kilometer 42 Kurian 1992 table 17 
Population growth population doubling time in years 38 Kurian 1992 table 28 
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NOTES 
1
.This paper was prepared during my stay at the Wissenschafts Zentrum fűr Sozialwissenschaft Berlin, Germany. An earlier 
version was presented at the International Conference on Quality-of-Life at the University of Northern British Columbia, 
Prince George, Canada, August 1996. 
 2.The study reported in this paper is part of a broader research program on cross-national differences in quality of life at 
Erasmus  University. Other investigators are Joop Ehrhardt, Pietrika Okma, Piet Ouweneel and Peggy Schyns. Anton Kunst 
added also to this paper by his valuable comments. 
 3.The phrase 'quality-of-life in nations' has a somewhat broader connotation than 'livability of nations' or 'habitability of the 
nations'. The latter expressions refer primarily to a fit with the needs of inhabitants. The former expression also denotes moral 
and esthetical qualities of the citizens' life. As such it is closer to conceptions of 'ideal quality' of society (mentioned third). 
Here, the term 'quality-of-life in nations' is used in the limited meaning of 'livability' of nations. 
4. For a discussion of the adaptive functions affect see Morris (1992). Affect and cognition developed only in species that can 
choose how to live and where. The faculties would be of little use for plants.  
5. The difference between subjective 'ill-being' and 'well-being' was proposed by Headey & Wearing (1984) 
6. The Affect Balance Scale (ABS) has at least four advantages in a cross-national context. 1) ABS is less vulnerable for 
language differences than the single happiness- and satisfaction-items. Because ABS involves 10 items, possible distortions in 
translation and understanding are likely to neutralize each other. 2) ABS is also less vulnerable for desirability distortion, and 
therefore also less vulnerable for differential distortion of that kind. ABS inquires about recent affective experience, which a 
more tangible matter than general happiness and satisfaction. Also is admitting that one felt bad during the last few weeks less 
threatening than avowing oneself as unhappy. 4) ABS does not require acquaintance with concepts such as 'happiness' or 
satisfaction. Though single items on happiness do not appear to be vulnerable for these distortions either (Veenhoven 1993, 
chapter 5), use of ABS is still safer. 
 
7. The first cross-national surveys involving items on satisfaction were initiated in the USA and effected by Gallup Interna-
tional. In 1948, nine western nations were surveyed (Buchanan & Cantril 1953). In 1960 and 1975 world-surveys were 
performed (Cantril 1965, Gallup 1975). These were once-only projects. Periodic quality-of-life surveys were held in most of 
the rich nations since the 1970's. Initially, these surveys provided little opportunity for cross-national comparison of satisfacti-
on, because items differed too much. Over the years, the pool of comparable items has grown, both as a result of spontaneous 
consensus and deliberate effort to develop standard questions. In 1991, the International-Social-Survey-Program (ISSP) in-
cluded the same set of questions on satisfaction in 12 nations. In the early 1980's the first World Value Survey (WVS1), took 
place in 22 nations. The standard questionnaire of that survey involves three items on happiness. In the early 1990's WVS2 
was held in 43 nations. WVS 3 is planned to cover about 75 nations at the turn of the century. 
 
8. Socalled 'Sullivan method'. Firstly, life-expectancy at a certain age is estimated, by adding survival chances in each of the 
following years. These survival chances are the observed survival rates in death tables. F.e. .....?? Secondly, years in bad 
health are estimated on the basis of data on incidence of serious impairment in age categories. F.e. if survey data show that of 
the 80-years old 50% is in bad health, survivors to age 80 can expect to spend half of the year to their 81st birthday in bad 
health. 
 This method makes sense if the purpose is to estimate the healthy life-expectancy of a particular person at a certain age. Yet 
specification by age is not necessary if the purpose is to estimate general life-expectancy of the population.  
 Age specification is also more appropriate in the case of 'healthy' life-expectancy than in the case of 'happy' life-expectancy. 
Health does indeed deteriorate with increasing age, but happiness does not (Okma & Veenhoven).   
9. One could object that high infant mortality does not really signify poor quality-of-life, because it is fairly natural and 
sometimes even necessary for avoiding overpopulation. From that point of view one can better depart from life-expectancy at 
age 5 or so. 
 In this explorative study I opt for life-expectancy at birth, both because this conceptually the most consequent and because the 
other way leads into arbitrary choice. Still I acknowledge that this rigor may involve a blow-up of the differences between 
developed and under-developed nations. 
10.Of the 48 nations of which we know the average report on 'happiness', 42 were surveyed in the context of the World values 
Study 2. All these surveys involved an identical question, situated in the same place in the questionnaire. The question is: 
"Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?". 
 The other 6 cases come from various surveys and involved slightly different rating scales. These cases are: Australia, Greece, 
Israel, Luxembourg, New Zealand and the Philippines. 
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 Scores on all items were transformed to scale 0-1 by means of Thurstone scaling (expert weighing). This procedure is 
described and evaluated in Veenhoven 1993: chapter 7). 
11.In the World Values Study, overall happiness is measured by a single question rated on a 4 step scale, life-satisfaction by a 
single question rated on a 10 step scale and Affect Balance by a 10 item index. Intercorrelations are: Happiness by life-
satisfaction: +.90, Happiness by Affect Balance +.61, and life-satisfaction by Affect Balance  +.61. 
12.Scores of Argentina, Chile and China may be too high. The happiness scores of these nations are based on samples in which 
poor rural population was under represented.   
13.One possible positive effect could be that people can shirk from wage-work, when unmotivated or unfit. This effect is likely 
to be most pronounced in the nations that pair high work demands with good social security. 
14.Among the poor nations these variables explain single life-expectancy better (70%) than single happiness (30%). However 
among the rich nations they differentiate more on single happiness (44%) than on single life-satisfaction (24%). This is 
comprehensible if we remember scheme 4, which showed that poor countries differ more in life-expectancy than in happiness, 
and rich countries more in happiness than in life-expectancy. 
 15.The Human Development Index is also available in a version with gender equality included, called 'Gender-sensitive HDI). 
See Human  Development Report 1992  table 1.3.  
16.Missing values estimated: 
 * Northern Ireland: between Great Britain and Ireland ($ 10.600) 
 * Czecho-Slovakia: like neighbouring East European nations ($ 7.420) 
17 The amount of daily calories needed is 2500. All countries at or above that level were coded 0. Cases below coded as number 
less than the required 2500. In this dataset only four countries score below that level (India, China, Nigeria, Philippines) 
18.Data 1980. Some scores seem implausible (Finland 84%, Spain 78%, Hungary 44%) 
19.Square meter per person would seem a better indicator. However, for a lot of nations data on this matter are not available. 
20.The question about family income was not identical in all countries. In most cases subjects were asked to indicate their 
income on a 10 step scale, where each answer category was defined in local currency. In a few cases scales of a different 
lenght were used (France, USA, Canada, Mexico, South Africa, Czecho-Slovakia) scales of a different length were used. 
These were recoded to scale 1-10. In  Romania the answer categories were not labeled with monetary values. Respondents 
indicated their income position from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). 
 In the responses, extremely high incomes cannot be recognized. F.e. in Germany the highest income category is labeled: DM 
8.000 or more per month. This reduces the dispersion on this measure.  
21 The indicators listed here do not inform about freedom of press. Freedom of press is part of the civil liberty index (see 
freedom) 
22 Data may be dated. Kurian does not specify period. 
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